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1 Introduction
In a Monopolistic Competition (MC), several companies produce similar but differentiated
products, and each company sets its price and sales quantity constrained by the market demand
system. This form of competition was initially studied by Chamberlin (1933) and to some ex-
tent by Robinson (1933), but this model was never formulated in terms of analytical equations.
A second and more successful wave within MC literature was spurred by the seminal papers of
Spence (1976) and especially by Dixit and Stiglitz (1977). This approach is workable to com-
pute the demand faced by each firm. It is built under the premise that a representative consumer
maximizes a CES utility function over the substitute products subject to a budget constraint. In
a Nash equilibrium all companies maximize their profits in prices, and their decisions are com-
patible in the demand system. Similar results have been obtained by considering heterogenous
consumers (e.g. Sattinger 1984, Hart 1985a, 1985b). Zhelobodko et al. (2012) discuss some
limitations of this model. The third wave of MC models was based on McFadden’s (1981,
1984) multinomial and nested Logit models, where consumers face mutually exclusive choices
maximizing a stochastic utility function (see Perloff and Salop 1985, Berry 1994 and Berry
et al. 1995). Additional refinements have been considered such as McFadden’s (1978) GEV
models (e.g. Bresnahan et al., 1997), and mixed Multinomial Logits (see McFadden and Train,
2000). This approach is widespread in the new empirical industrial organization (see e.g. Berry
et al. 1996, 1999 and 2004) and the marketing literature (Bensanko et al. 1988, Allenby and
Rossi 1991); and to a lesser extent in economic theory, due in part to the micro-foundation
weakness when dealing with the budget constraint in the consumer decision problem and the
simplification of rent-effects (see Berry et al. 1994 and Petrin 2002). A crucial characteristic of
both the Spence-Dixit-Stiglitz and the stochastic utility models is that they produce an aggre-
gated demand system. Friedman (1977) and Shubik with Levitan (1980) actually postulated to
use an aggregate demand system directly in MC oversimplification of the individual consumer
underpinnings.
Independently of the attention given to the behavior of representative/heterogeneous con-
sumers, all these MC models compute the aggregated demand for each firm as a function of
their own price and the competitor ones. Then, the equilibrium is solved in prices (as a Bertrand
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competition). Therefore, costs become the central issue in the discussion about profitability,
and the potential entrance of additional competitors. The way in which products are differenti-
ated is linked to these costs, and this problem is often endogenized in the model considering of
a two-step game for product design and prices. In these models, the market power often leads
to a low level of strategic interaction, where the decision of each firm has little impact on their
competitors’ payoffs. But price competition may be inadequate for many MC industries where
the companies fix the price strategically from time to time, print it on the cover of the prod-
uct, and adapt their sales to consumers’ orders. For example, this is the case with newspapers.
Unfortunately, given the difficulty to obtain an inverse aggregated demand system (unless we
consider a linear demand system), Cournot equilibrium is generally not considered in the MC
context.
In this paper we present a product differentiation model where firms compete in quanti-
ties. The model is based on a new consumer decision model, specifically designed to produce
a flexible nonlinear inverse demand system appropriate for its use in MC where firms com-
pete in quantities. A key advantage of the presented inverse demand system is its convenience
for applied work, as it resembles the classical Multinomial Logit model. We discuss several
conceptual extensions of the model, in particular the case where consumers’ decision are parti-
tioned over different subcategories of substitutive products.
We apply the proposed to the Spanish newspaper industry. The newspaper industry is highly
competitive and exposed to environmental threats, and their revenues are dependent on inter-
related streams provided by sales and advertising. The media industry can also be considered
as a particular type of two-sided market. These are markets characterized by bilateral network
externalities. The demand on one side (advertisers) depends on the consumption of agents on
the other market side (readers). Two sided markets posses specific features in terms of pricing
principles and externalities. There has been a recent surge of interest in two-sided markets
in Industrial Organization (IO) after the seminal papers by Rochet and Tirole (2002, 2003),
Caillaud and Jullien (2003), and Armstrong (2006).
Newspaper’s advertising spending depends on its expected readership; i.e. the expected to-
tal circulation multiplied by the average number of readers per copy. A newspaper’s circulation
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is the number of copies that it distributes on an average day. Circulation is not the same as
copies sold, since some copies of newspapers are distributed for free. To increase circulation
(or the advertising share of the market), newspapers give away free copies distributed by hand,
postal delivery, or placing racks in well-transited locations such as public transport stations,
hospitals, shopping centers, universities and so on. Publishers can also cut prices (subsidize
prices) to increase circulation. Higher circulation attracts advertisers, and these revenues en-
able a spiral down of prices and a spiral up of sales, with advertising accounting for 70-80% of
their revenues. Newsstand sales account for nearly 15-20% revenues, and subscriptions just for
the 1-3%. The efficacy of these strategies to attract advertising is heterogeneous, for it depends
on the average number of newspaper readers per copy.
We model the Spanish newspapers market taking into account all the interactions of these
factors, as: (1) The traditional newspapers’ returns at each period depend on current sales,
and the share of advertising determined by previous circulation (sales and given-away issues).
Given-away issues introduce a negative externality on current demand; (2) All firms compete
in quantity, and we use the proposed MC model to address this goal; (3) To account for the
role of information in the competitiveness of the market, our modelling framework considers
the effects of rational expectations, anticipating how many other competing brands are likely to
be produced and what the associated residual inverse demand is. The model can be estimated
by the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM). Our results prove how this approach allows
companies in a monopolistic competition to set production, adjusting their prices implicitly.
2 Benchmark model with a representative consumer
Consider an economy consisting of a representative consumer and L firms competing for quan-
tities ql of a non-homogeneous product.
Consumers. Consumer preferences over consumption bundles (q1; :::; qL) are represented
by a utility function
u (q) =
LX
l=1
1
l
exp (l + l ql) ; (1)
where ql  0 is the quantity chosen for product l. The parameters fl; lgLl=1 reflect taste
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differences over the substitutive products. Note that u (ql) is monotonously increasing in ql for
l 6= 0, since
@u
@ql
= exp (l + l ql) > 0:
For each product l, the coefficients must satisfy that l < 0, so that @2u=@q2l < 0: The utility
takes negative values for negative ’s; but a monotonous transformation could re-scale u into
the positive half-line without loss of generality (by adding PLl=1  1l ). To avoid overparame-
trization, we typically normalize the coefficient L = 0:
The representative consumer’s expenditure constraint is given by
PL
l=1 pl ql  m; where pl
is the price of product l at and m is the representative consumer’s total shopping budget. From
the optimality First Order Conditions (FOC), the representative consumer demands a bunch of
products satisfying:
exp (l + lql)   pl = 0; l = 1; :::; L; (2)
where  is the Lagrange multiplier of the budget constraint. The ratio of any l; j optimality
conditions yields
pl
pj
=
exp (l + l ql)
exp
 
j + j qj
 : (3)
Taking logarithms, a linear structural demand model in q is satisfied:
ln pl   ln pj = l   j + l ql   j qj; (4)
for all l; j: These equations together with the budget constraint define a linear system in quan-
tities that can be used to solve the Marshallian demand system (see Appendix A1 for details).
Notice that from (4), the demand price elasticity is negative, and given by
"l =
dql=ql
dpl=pl
=
dql
d ln pl
1
ql
=

ql
d ln pl
dql
 1
=
1
lql
< 0:
The cross elasticities are given by
"l;j =
dql=ql
dpj=pj
=
dql
d ln pj
1
ql
=

ql
d ln pj
dql
 1
=   1
jql
> 0;
5
meaning that when the price of product j goes up the quantity demanded of product l will
increase; in other words, the two goods l; j are substitutes for each other.
Next we focus on determining the inverse demand function. Given the mean of prices
 = L 1
PL
l=1 pl; and using the optimality conditions (3), we have
L
pj
=
LX
l=1
pl
pj
=
PL
l=1 exp (l + lql)
exp
 
j + jqj
 :
Thus, the inverse of demand function for any product j = 1; : : : ; L is given by
pj =
exp
 
j + jqj
PL
l=1 exp (l + lql)
L: (5)
Notice also that, from the FOC conditions (2), the Lagrange multiplier is given by,
 =
exp (l + lql)
pl
=
LX
l=1
exp (l + lql) =L:
The extension of the model to the case of heterogeneous consumers is straightforward (see
Appendix A2).
Note that we can consider normalized prices in the simplex, setting L = 1, then we obtain
the inverse demand function for each product
pj =
exp
 
j + jqj
PL
l=1 exp (l + lql)
; j = 1; : : : ; L: (6)
However, in many instances the mean price  should be included to account for exogenous
nominal price effects. Therefore, the inverse demand system has analytical expression that
resembles that of a Multinomial Logistic conditional probability distribution, and therefore it
is quite flexible and can be easily estimated. A price inelastic product L can be also considered
as a limit case, if L; L; L ! 0; yielding
pL =
 
1 +
L 1X
l=1
expl + lql
! 1
pj =
exp
 
j + jqj

1 +
PL 1
l=1 exp (l + lql)
; j = 1; :::; L  1:
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Notice that in a ceteribus paribus context, the residual inverse demand of firm j can be
expressed as
pj =
exp
 
j + jqj

Kj + exp
 
j + jqj

for a constantKj =
P
l 6=j exp (l + lql) :One of the advantages of this model is the flexibility
of the Logistic function to fit many different patterns often observed in empirical contexts. Fig-
ure 1 shows different shapes of inverse demand functions based on the proposed specification.
Figure 1: Shapes of inverse demand functions for different parameters
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Producers and Market equilibrium: Next we study the market equilibrium in a Cournot-
type competition based on the inverse demand system (5), where each company is profit-
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maximizer in quantities qj of a differentiated product with different cost functions cj () monoton-
ically nondecreasing and convex. Thus, each company faces the following problem:
j (q) = pj (q) qj   cj (qj) =
 
exp
 
j + jqj
PL
l=1 exp (l + lql)
L
!
qj   cj (qj) : (7)
The solution to the FOC for maximization of (7) satisfies the system of equations:
@j (q)
@qj
= pj (q) + j qj pj (q)

1  pj (q)
L

  c0j (qj) = 0;
where c0j (qj) denotes the partial derivative of the cost function. The solution is the unique
maximizer of the profit function (7) provided that the second-order condition for profit maxi-
mization:
@2j (q)
@2qj
=
@pj
@qj
+
h
j pj

1  pj
L
i
+ j qj
@pj
@qj

1  pj
L

+j qj pj

  1
L

@pj
@qj
  c00j (qj)
=
@pj
@qj

2 + j qj

1  pj
L

  j
L
qj pj

  c00j (qj)
=
@pj
@qj
(2 + j qj )  c00j (qj) < 0;
is satisfied, which holds e.g. if (2 + j qj )  0 as the derivative of the inverse demand is
negative:
@pj
@qj
=
@
@qj
 
exp
 
j + jqj

exp
 
j + jqj

+
P
l 6=j exp (l + lql)
L
!
= jpj   j 1
L
p2j = j pj

1  1
L
pj

 0:
We have compared the outcome of the Cournot type equilibrium, with the result provided by
a Bertrand competition. Notice that from the first first-order optimality condition, it is satisfied
that
pj (q)  c0j (qj)
L
=  j qj pj (q)
L

1  pj (q)
L

  0:5 j qj = 1 2"j ;
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as (pj (q)/L) (1  (pj (q)/L))  0:5. In particular, for c0j (qj) = cj is constant, then we
obtain a lower bound for the unit margin,
(pj   cj)  L
2
j"jj 1 :
In contrast, the competition in prices renders the Lender condition
(pj   cj) = pj j"jj 1
meaning that competing higher Firms’ unit margins are in quantities than in prices whenever
L > 2pj (which is the usual case as the sum or prices by all competitors is usually higher
than two times the price charged by one of them). Firms would more likely prefer competing
in quantities than in prices.
3 Extensions of the benchmark model
The proposed consumer model generates a flexible inverse demand system that can be adapted
to a variety of cases. Here we discuss some possible extensions.
Multi attribute models: In the benchmark model, product differentiation is reflected in the
parameters of the utility function. Notice that instead of setting different parameters

j; j
	J
j=1
in utility function we can introduce a vector x of product attributes. For example, if u (q) =PL
l=1 
 1
l exp (+ ql + 
0xl), the inverse demand would be given by,
pj =
exp (+ qj + 
0xj)PL
l=1 exp (+ ql + 
0xl)
L; j = 1; : : : ; L: (8)
In particular, if x is quality we can study vertical product differentiation using this model,
but we can use location attributes instead. Note also that setting qj = 1 for all j; model (8)
can be used to justify a new type of nonlinear Hedonic Regression explaining unit prices for
all substitutive products through differences in products’ attributes. Competition can be also
considered in terms of product attributes. But this paper does not delve into this idea. Notice
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also that any externality affecting the utility of the consumers can end up included in the inverse
demand function, similarly to the variable x:
Multiple categories. In our model, similarly to the Dixit-Stiglitz framework, the relative
optimal consumption of two distinct varieties is a function of their relative prices (and vice
versa). This property is meaningful provided that changes in the consumption of third products
do not affect substitutability preferences for two given products, which is not necessarily true.
There are some extensions that can modify this property. For example, consider a utility model
over K different bunches of product categories,
ui (q) =
KX
k=1
1
k
exp
 
k +
X
l2Bk
k
lk
exp (l + lql)
!
:
where fBkgkk=1 is a partition of all goods in K categories of nested products, and k; k < 0.
To compute the inverse demand system, we parametrize the budget constraint in a conve-
nient form. We denote the normalized prices on each bundle by fwlgl2Bk ; with
P
l2Bk wl = 1:
Then, the price of a product ql can be expressed as the product pkwl where pk is the relative
value of bundle k which is also normalized. Therefore, we can parametrize the budget con-
straint as
KX
k=1
pk
 X
l2Bk
wlql
!
= m;
where we consider an overall simplex normalization
PK
k=1 pk
 P
l2Bk wl

= 1 over the prices
fpkg : Now we can compute the inverse demand functions for a bundle price, and for products
inside a bundle similarly to the general case.
Computing the first order conditions, if l; j 2 Bk; then for the optimal consumption plan,
wl
wj
=
exp (l + lql)
exp
 
j + jqj
 :
leading to the inverse of demand for products in category k;
wj =
exp
 
j + jqj
P
l2Bk exp (l + lql)
: (9)
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For elements j 2 Bk and l 2 Bk0 in different nests, we obtain that
pk0wl
pkwj
=
exp

k +
P
l2Bk0
k0
l
exp (l + lql)

exp (l + lql)
exp

k +
P
l2Bk
k
l
exp (l + lql)

exp
 
j + jqj
 :
We define the utility of the optimal nest Uk =
P
l2Bk
1
lk
exp (l + lql) ; then
pk0wl
pkwj
=
exp (k0 + k0Uk0) exp (l + lql)
exp (k + kUk) exp
 
j + jqj
 :
adding similar conditions and using that
PK
k=1 pk
 P
l2Bk wl

= 1; we obtain that
1
pkwj
=
PK
k0=1 pk0
P
l2Bk0 wl

pkwj
=
PK
k0=1 exp (k0 + k0Uk0)
P
l2Bk0 exp (l + lql)

exp (k + kUk) exp
 
j + jqj
 :
Therefore, inverting the expression
pkwj =
exp (k + kUk) exp
 
j + jqj
PK
k0=1 exp (k0 + k0Uk0)
P
l2Bk0 exp (l + lql)
 ;
substituting wj = exp
 
j + jqj

=
P
l2Bk exp (l + lql) ; and canceling terms we obtain
that
pk =
exp (k + kUk)
 P
l2Bk exp (l + lql)

PK
k0=1 exp (k0 + k0Uk0)
P
l2Bk0 exp (l + lql)

=
P
l2Bk exp (k + kUk + l + lql)PK
k0=1
P
l2Bk0 exp (k0 + k0Uk0 + l + lql)
: (10)
The actual price of a commodity j 2 Bk based on the inverse demand is given by the product
pkwj . The extended version of the model based on (9) and (10) is particularly relevant when
the overall consumer expenditure on different product categories is modeled together with the
choice of differentiated product on each category. Utility functions with more than two sequen-
tial levels of nests can be handled alike.
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4 Empirical application to the Newspaper Industry
In this section we present an empirical application to the Spanish newspaper industry, where
revenue streams are drawn from newsstand and subscription paid copy sales and from adver-
tising. Advertising revenues depends on previous circulation. Spanish Newspapers usually
give away some free copies to increase circulation, aimed at differentiated individuals to avoid
sales cannibalization. We propose a model where sold units and given away copies are used as
strategic tools.
There is a piece of classical economic literature investigating different features of newspa-
per competition, (see e.g., Reddaway (1963), Ferguson (1963, 1983), Telser (1966), and Rosse
(1967, 1970)). It is based on monopolistic competition models where firms compete in price, in
both sales and attracting advertising. But price competition has limitations in this framework.
Newspaper prices show small variability, and since revenues are drawn from sales, and adver-
tising driven by expected circulation, publisher decisions on the two key strategic variables,
sales and given-away issues, maximize forward expected returns. In this paper, we consider
the competition in two-sided markets with differentiated products and sales competition “a la
Cournot”. To this end, we propose a new model for competition in markets with differentiated
products, providing a flexible nonlinear inverse demand system.
The dynamics of this market are a relevant issue. Newspapers are edited daily; today’s
newspapers will be nothing more than wrapping paper tomorrow, so that every day the de-
mands for sold copies are essentially static and independent. On the contrary, the demand for
advertising space depends on expected circulation and therefore has a dynamic component.
The objective of this paper is to gain insight into the nature of the competitive strategies in a
market with differentiated products, in which firms compete for quantities over time, and have
rational expectations about their rivals’ actions and optimize their strategic response at each
time. Perfect equilibrium in dynamic games can be used to study market trends and cycles
(Pakes and Ericson 1998, Pakes and MacGuire 2001). The key idea is to combine strategic
foresight and interaction effects in the model; this is particularly relevant in two-sided markets.
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4.1 Data
We have used data from Spanish daily national newspapers. Circulation data were gathered
by the auditing organization Oficina de Justificación de la Difusión (OJD) for montly sales
and given away newspapers, owned by Introl S.L, and advertising data have been provided
by InfoAdex, which is the main advertising auditing company in Spain. The sample period
begins January, 1995 and ends December, 2004. We have considered monthly sales, advertising
revenues and given away units of the main Spanish national newspapers during this period
(ABC, El Mundo and the leader El País). Table 1 shows the average sales and the average
given-away units of newspapers within the sample period. The leader El País is left-wing
oriented, whereas the second player El Mundo is right-wing oriented, advocating modern style
liberalism. ABC is the oldest, with a right wing perspective linked to traditional conservatism
(monarchist and Catholic).
Table 1: Averages sales and giving away units of newspapers
Monthly Sales Given away units % given away over sales
ABC 244,333 9,168 3.75%
El Mundo 253,956 8,920 3.51%
El País 401,451 12,132 3.02%
Advertising expenditure on each newspapers is quite seasonal. Although there is some ef-
fect on sales, it is not so strong. We have extracted the seasonal component in all the considered
time series. To that in the end we have used two linked seasonal adjustment programs: TRAMO
(Time series Regression with ARIMA noise, Missing observations, and Outliers) and SEATS
(Signal Extraction in ARIMA Time Series). The programs TRAMO/SEATS, were developed
by Agustin Maravall and Victor Gomez at the Bank of Spain. TRAMO provides automatic
ARIMA modeling, while SEATS computes the components for seasonal adjustment based on
TRAMO ARIMA-model. SEATS uses signal extraction based on the ARIMA filters which fit
to the series by TRAMO to extract the seasonal components.
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4.2 The newspapers model
Newspaper publishers compete with closely related, but differentiated products over the periods
of time t = 0; 1; 2 : : :. Let index l = 1 denote the newspaper ABC, index 2 the newspaper El
Mundo, and 3 the leader El País. Their dynamic decision problem where the strategic space
of the firms consists of the sold quantities qjt and the number of giveaways sjt at each period
of time t. It is a two-sided market, the advertising market is dynamic (expected advertising
depends on previous circulation), and the other side of the market is essentially static (sold
copies are marketed daily). The utility function of the representative customer at time t is given
by
u (qtjEt) =
3X
l=1
1
l
exp (l + lqlt) ; (11)
with 3 = 0: We assume that the newspapers’ quality and printing characteristics, market area,
and scale of printing plant are given decisions. We will consider that firms l = 1; 2; 3 behave
strategically, competing in quantities and subsidies (given away products), where current sub-
sidies enhance future demands. Under monopolistic competition, the residual demand of firm
j when its rivals set fqeltgl 6=j is given by
pjt (qjt) =
exp
 
j + jqjt

exp
 
j + jqjt

+Kejt
Lt; (12)
Kejt =
X
l 6=j
exp (l + lq
e
lt) (13)
Since we are in a partial equilibrium setup we do not introduce money demand as a numeraire,
nor consider the price simplex, but consider that the nominal level or mean newspapers prices
t in the economy is exogenously given. In addition newspapers receive a large part of their
profits from advertising. We consider that the revenues obtained by firm j = 1; 2; 3 are given
by,
ajt = wj;t 1  At;
where At is the total advertising expense received by the industry which is considered exoge-
nous, and wj;t 1 is the share of the advertising market which depends on the total circulation
in the previous period (qjt 1 + sjt 1) ; relatively to that of other competitors. In particular, we
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now consider a classical Multinomial Logistic regression model, where
wj;t 1 = wj (qjt 1 + sjt 1) =
exp

j + j (qjt 1 + sjt 1)
	PL
l=1 exp fl + l (qlt 1 + slt 1)g
:
with j  0; and to ensure identification 3 = 0: In each period newspapers decide fqjt; sjtg
before knowing the exogenous variables and the decisions of their competitors. Regarding
the overall advertising budget At, we generally consider that it follows an exogenous process
driven by its past and other exogenous variables (e.g., the inter-annual growth or rate in the
GDP).
4.2.1 Market equilibria
Assume that mean price and advertising fAt; tgt0 follow a predictable exogenous stochastic
process, and denote by cjt () the cost function of firm j. Under the rationality assumption, each
firm aims to maximize its expected profit, given the conjectures. In the Nash equilibrium, each
firm j aims to maximize its discounted profit
j

fqjt; sjtgt0

= E0
"X
t0
t jt
#
;
jt = (pjt (qjt) qjt   (cjt (qjt) + kjt (sjt)) + ajt (qjt 1 + sjt 1)) :
where  = (1 + i) 1 is the discount parameter (i > 0 is the interest rate),Et [] is the conditional
expectation available at time t; cjt (qjt) and and kjt (sjt) are respectively the cost functions
for sold and given away issues (they will be assumed linear but different, as the distribution
channels are very different for both types of products), ajt (qjt 1 + sjt 1) = wj (qjt 1 + sjt 1)
At; and the optimal decision is compatible with their rivals’ decisions, i.e. qelt = qlt and selt = slt
in (12).
The dynamic process for fAt; tg is forecasted by firms using rational expectations. The
arrival of new information sometimes turns the strategic response suboptimal (i.e. the Nash
equilibrium involves "incredible" threats). A commonly-used refinement is given by the no-
tion of Subgame Perfect Equilibrium, i.e. an equilibrium in which the strategies are a Nash
equilibrium within each subgame (defined by the information set It 1). A subgame perfect
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equilibrium is the long-run outcome of dynamic learning equilibrium paths. In a subgame per-
fect equilibrium, at each time t each firm j = 1; 2; 3 maximizes its conditional expected profit
given the available information, i.e. we require that at any time s  0; each firm j maximize
its discounted profit
js

fqjt; sjtgts

= Es
"X
ts
t s jt
#
;
and the optimal decision is compatible with their rivals decisions. Notice that the conditional
expectations only affect to pjt and ajt replacing t; At by their conditional expectations; we
will consider this implicitly in the following equations.
The equilibrium can be characterized by the first order conditions. Using that @ fpjt  qjtg =@qjt =
pjt + qjt@pjt=@qjt; at each time s the decisions of firm j satisfy for any t  s,
Es

@js
qjt

= t sEs

pjt + qjt
@pjt
@qjt
  @cjt
@qjt
+ 
@ajt+1
@qjt+1

= 0;
Es

@js
sjt

= t sEs

 @kjt
@sjt
+ 
@ajt+1
@sjt+1

= 0:
where Es [] is the conditional expectation to available information on states previous to s, that
we consider symmetric for all players. Therefore, the subgame perfect equilibrium satisfies at
any time t  0 the conditional moment conditions:
Et 1

pjt + qjt jpjt (1  pjt=Lt)  c0jt (qjt) + jwjt (1  wjt)At+1

= 0;
Et 1
 k0jt (sjt) + jwjt (1  wjt)At+1 = 0; (14)
Subtracting both equations in (14) we can rewrite the first equation as
Es

pjt + qjt j pjt (1  pjt=Lt) 
 
c0jt (qjt)  k0jt (sjt)

= 0:
In particular, if we consider a linear cost functions (cjtqjt + kjtsjt), we can conclude that
Es [pjt + qjt j pjt (1  pjt=Lt)  (cjt   kjt)] = 0: (15)
and kjt = Et 1

jwjt (1  wjt)At+1

. The most relevant condition for out inference analysis
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is (15), where we will consider  = (cjt   kjt) as a constant cost parameter to estimate, and
we will assume that it is common for all newspapers.
4.3 Estimation
We have estimated the parameters of the model discussed in the previous section using the
Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimation, for details see Hansen (1982), where as
usual the estimation is carried out in two steps: first we estimate the parameters (using the
instruments variance as weighting matrix) and in the second step we update the weights to
achieve asymptotic efficiency (using a Newey-West type weight matrix with 12 lags). The
procedure is then iterated ten times. Notice that if the solution Xt of an economic model with
parameters 0 satisfies the a set of conditional moments Et 1

g
 
0; Xt

= 0, then the Law of
iterated expectations implies the orthogonality conditions
E

g
 
0; Xt

Wt = 0; (16)
for any vector of instruments Wt in the conditioning information set, where 
 denotes the
Kronecker product. The GMM estimator typically estimates 0 minimizing a quadratic form
based on the empirical analogous to the system (16). For the discount parameter  = (1 + i) 1
we have considered a monthly rate is i = 0:1=12; so that the annual rate is approximately 10%.
We have focused on sold newspapers. Notice that the conditional moment conditions (15)
are satisfied in the equilibrium for all period of time t = 0; 1; : : : ; T and j = 1; 2; 3. In
addition, the actual prices Pjt should fit the inverse demand model pjt, and we have considered
the condition Et 1 [(Pjt   pjt)] = 0; so that
E [(Pjt   pjt)
Wt] = 0; j = 1; 2; 3: (17)
using and linear symmetric cost  = (cjt   kjt) : The instruments are Wt =
 
1; q0t 1
0
; i.e. one
lag for all sales. Table 2 shows the GMM estimation results with moment conditions (15) and
(17).
17
Table 2: Parameter estimations
Parameter Estimation Std. Err Stat. t p value
1  0:08463 0:014  5:88 0:00
2  0:0636 0:004  14:78 0:00
1  1:4 107 1:8 108  7:7 0:00
2  1:7 107 1:0 108  17:17 0:00
3  2:0 107 1:2 108  16:08 0:00
 1:01 0:0042 235 0:00
The t-statistics and the p-values are testing the null hypotheses that all parameters are equal
to zero, implying all parameters are significant. Note that the number of moment conditions
is higher than the number of parameters. The value of Hansens’ overidentification statistics is
J = 12:93, and Pr f218 > Jg = 0:7954 and we accept the over-identifying moment conditions.
Figure 2 shows the inverse demand price forecast for each of the three newspapers, compared
with actual data. Looking at the results in Figure 2, we find that on average the observed
prices are close to the optimal ones based on the model. The fit is remarkable, given the
little variability in prices that we have observed in the sample. The largest difference between
observed and fitted prices corresponds to the newspaper ABC. In particular, we observe that
ABC applied a suboptimal price between 37th sample month (January 2002) and the 60th one
(December 2004). In January 2002, the Euro currency was introduced, and the ABC response
was perhaps motivated by monetary illusion considerations. Eventually, ABC upgraded prices
to a level slightly above the optimal value.
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Figure 2: Actual price data and model forecast
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We have estimated the advertising response functions. We have denotedAjt as actual adver-
tising revenues of publisher j = 1; 2; 3 and At =
P3
j=1Ajt. We have required the advertising
model ajt = wjt 1At to satisfy Et 1 [(Ajt   ajt)] = 0, and from here we can also obtain the
orthogonality conditions
E [(Ajt   wjt 1At)
Wt] = 0; j = 1; 2; 3:
We have estimated the parameters of the demand for advertising by GMM using this sys-
tem, using Wt = (1; At 1; At 2; At 3)0 as instruments. Table 3 shows the GMM estima-19
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tors. The leader, El País, has the lowest advertising elasticity with respect to circulation (with
3 = 1  10 6), and El Mundo is the most sensitive to circulation. The value of Hansens’
overidentification statistics is J = 18:77, and Pr f225 > Jg = 0:80 and we accept the over-
identifying moment conditions. The results validate that the advertising specification is appro-
priate for this industry.
Table 3: Parameter estimations for the advertising response model
Parameter Estimation Std. Err Stat. t p value
1  0:7788 0:3183  2:45 0:01
2  3:72 0:6189  6:02 0:00
1 4 10 6 8 10 7 4:95 0:00
2 14 10 6 2:5 10 7 5:72 0:00
3 1 10 6 4 10 7 2:33 0:01
Figure 3 shows the fit between forecasts based on the estimated weights fwjtg and the
actualAjt:Recall that the data are deseasonalized, and fluctuations are associated to circulation.
Notice that ABC advertising revenues were lower during the central period, and they have the
higher percentage of given away copies over sold ones (3.75% on average).
Based on these results we can conclude that the newspapers industry can be modeled with
the proposed model. But we also warn about some problems. If we put together all the moment
conditions, then we face computational problems minimizing GMM, with multiplicity of local
minima. By focusing on each area in a separated way, we do not suffer from that problem. Per-
haps with a larger sample, that problem can be overcome, as GMM is sensitive to the inclusion
of a large number of moment conditions.
Based on the previous demand estimates, we can now explore the cost parameters. Notice
that from the second equation in (14), we can estimate the overall unit cost k of given away
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issues using GMM, based on the moment condition
Et 1
  k + jwjt (1  wjt)At+1
Wt = 0;
for j = 1; 2; 3: with Wt = (1; At 1; At 2; At 3)0 and we can estimate k, where the parameters
in wjt are replaced by the estimators. In particular we obtain k = 0:8843 and we can recover
the estimation of the unit cost of sold copies c =  + k = 1:8947: The estimated cost of sold
copies is slightly higher than the range of prices observed in the sample, suggesting that during
this period advertising is partially subsidizing this side of the market.
Figure 3: Forecasted and actual advertising cash-flows for the three newspapers
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Newspapers are differentiated products. An interesting question is whether publishers tend
to charge different prices. A price differentiation index can be computed at the equilibrium,
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based on the notion of “entropy”, using the measure
H =  
LX
j=1
 pj
L

log
 pj
L

:
Notice that H  ln (L) ; with equality if and only if all pj = : Using the inverse demand
system, it can be considered as a function of q; but we can simply compute it for the equilibrium
prices. The actual mean prices for the period (normalized to the simplex) for publishers j =
1; 2; 3 are 0:331; 0:335 and 0:330; respectively, and we obtain an entropy index
H =   (0:331 ln (0:331) + 0:335 ln (0:335) + 0:330 ln (0:330)) = 1:0982;
quite close to ln (3) = 1:0986: This result confirms that in equilibrium the actual price differ-
entiation is not too strong. But the differences in parameters of the inverse demand system pj
makes this compatible with significant differences in sales, and the attraction of different levels
of advertising revenues.
4.4 Limitations and possible extensions
The empirical application is presented as an example of a potentially insightful application, but
there are several extensions that could be tackled if the model is implemented in a different
time period, or another country. We will discuss some of them.
4.4.1 The Internet
There is a third side of the newspaper industry that we have not considered, as it has developed
over the last decade and in our sample it did not yet play such a crucial role. Nowdays, most
general newspapers provide online access for free to attract digital advertising revenues (mainly
through displays such as banners, and digital classified). Newspapers’ digital advertising rev-
enue is relatively small (typically less than 5% of total advertising revenue, albeit growing), as
media agencies consider that this type of advertising has less impact than the off-line advertis-
ing; perhaps it improves in the future (driven by access to tables and specially mobile devices).
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Digital traffic can be measured, and that is the reference to allocate higher shares to different
newspapers. However, it cannot be easily controlled by newspapers except for quality and ser-
vices in online contents (but that is generally a long-run strategic decision, and once it has been
settled there are not additional controls except for small tactic adjustments). For some years it
has been a relatively exogenous flow of revenues. Note that digital traffic of newspaper j could
be included in the externality component Ej: The third side would be more interesting from
an economic perspective if papers were willing to charge access. But most general newspapers
oppose pricing digital access for fear that the drop in digital adversting revenue flows may be
higher than the access revenues streams. Given the worth of online adversting for newspapers,
it was a matter of time to reconsider the strategy.
The situation is currently changing, driven by exogenous problems faced by this industry.
During the last decade newspapers’ global circulation has declined slowly in most developed
countries. In 2006, “The Economist” asked on its cover who had “killed the newspaper.” Nowa-
days there are roughly 1,350 surviving U.S. English-language daily newspapers, down from
about 1,400 five years ago, and only 70 of them have circulations above 100,000 (see, Rosen-
stiel et al., 2012). But things are now getting better. To stem losses, many papers have been
raising their subscription price and newsstand copies. In the USA, advertising revenues from
circulation are still declining but at a slower rate, and circulation revenues are stabilizing. In
addition, most papers are reconsidering the digital business model. Even if they do not charge
for digital access, they are increasingly charging readers for online content with “Paywalls”
methods (see: “News adventures,” The Economist, Dec. 8th, 2012). Newspapers acknowl-
edge now that some pay systems can work. A price decision can be used to control the digital
third-side of the market, and could be modeled using a classical price competition with differ-
entiated products. The whole industry of the future can be modeled as four-sided extension
to the presented model, with two digital sides (access and online advertising) and two off–line
sides (circulation and printed advertising), including externalities between the classical circu-
lation market and digital traffic (print and online papers are sometimes found to be substitutive
rather than complementary, see Gentzkov, 2007, but some articles report contradictory results,
see Deleersnyder et al., 2002). This is an interesting issue for future research.
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4.4.2 Local competitors
There is another limitation in the empirical analysis. The analysis has focused on the main
nationwide newspapers, i.e., we consider a market with a moderate number of firms. Neverthe-
less, there are many local newspapers that can attract readerships and have not been included.
To study the impact of having a large number of small competitors, we will consider the context
where the number of firms L ! 1, so that we can assume a continuous of products q , and a
utility function
U =
Z
exp
 
 + qt

dF () ;
and budget constraint
R
ptqtdF ()  mt: Then we can consider the inverse demand for each
firm is given by,
pjt =
exp
 
j + jqjt
R
exp
 
 + qt

dF ()
;
with
R
ptqtdF () = 1: In this context, firm actions do not affect the denominator (any firm
has zero mass) and the first order condition is simplified since
@
@qjt
pjt =
@
@sjt
pjt =
j exp
 
j + jqjt
R
exp
 
 + qt

dF ()
= jpjt < 0;
i.e. when quantities increase the price is deceased. To discuss the behavior of the model, assume
that there are not subsides and neither advertising revenues, then under perfect information the
maximization of profits jt = pjt  (qjt)  cjt (qjt) leads to
@
@qjt
(pjtqjt   cjs (qjs)) = jpjtqjt + pjt   cjt = 0;
implying that
pjt = (1 + jqjt)
 1 clt:
using jqjt < 0; so that pjt > clt: If advertising revenues are included,
ajt =
exp

j + j (qjt 1 + sjt 1)
	R
exp

 +  (qt 1 + st 1)
	
dF ()
At = wjtAt;
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The myopic maximization of profits under perfect information requires that,
@
@qjt
(pjtqjt   ajt   cls (qjs)) = jpjtqjt + pjt + jwjtAt   cjt = 0;
and pjt = (1 + jqjt) 1
 
clt   jwjtAt

; suggesting that pjt can be partially subsidize by
advertising. In these cases, it could be worth subsidizing the product completely, even with
added gifts. This is a commonly adopted strategy by some players in the newspaper market.
4.4.3 Free press
An extreme give-away strategy is followed by the free newspapers which generate all their rev-
enue from advertising, who exclusively give-away copies that usually have small unit costs (the
issues have less contents). In the last decade, free daily newspapers have been introduced in
most developed countries, and in some of then the market has been turned into a battlefield for
advertising. Internationally, the free press sector leaders are the Swedish company Metro Inter-
national (www.metro.lu), and the Norwegian company 20 Minutos A.G. (www.20minutes.com)
controlled by the Norwegian media group Shibsted. In Spain these groups are also the free press
leaders. The first local free newspapers were launched in the eighties, but the Spanish free press
took off in 2000. The most read free newspaper is now the leader and pioneer 20 Minutos with
over 2.4 million readers (higher than the traditional press leader El País). It started in February,
2000 with several dailies and in June 2001, a new owner (20 Minutos Holding) changed its
name. Que, ADN and Metro were launched in 2005. The competition was fierce and in 2009
the Spanish diary Metro closed. Our sample does not include data beyond 2004, and up to that
time the impact on traditional press was not so high (it was comparable to that of a small local
Newspaper), therefore we have not included it in the model.
In any case, the model can be modified to accommodate this phenomenon. If there r =
1; :::; F free newspapers, their advertising revenues at time t are art = wr;t 1  At where the
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shares of advertising are distributed between both types of newspapers as:
wj;t 1 = wj (qjt 1 + sjt 1) =
exp

j + j (qjt 1 + sjt 1)
	PL
l=1 exp fl + l (qlt 1 + slt 1)g+
PF
f=1 exp
n
f + f sf;t 1
o ;
wr;t 1 = wr (sjt 1) =
n
f + f sf;t 1
o
PL
l=1 exp fl + l (qlt 1 + slt 1)g+
PF
f=1 exp
n
f + f sf;t 1
o
The profits of paid Newspapers j = 1; :::L at time t would be given by
j = (pjt  qjt + ajt   (cjt (qjt) + kjt (sjt))) ;
where cjt and kjt are the cost functions (edition and distribution) of sold and given away units,
and the returns of free Newspapers f = 1; :::; F are given by ft = (af;t   kft (sf;t)) ; which
production and distribution costs are typically smaller than those of paid for press (as they only
use news agency which have few journalists, and distribute in selected places). In equilibrium,
the free Newspapers f = 1; :::; F maximize,
f

fsftgt0

= E0
"X
t0
t  ft
#
;
ft = (af;t   kft (sf;t)) ;
In a perfect equilibrium, free newspapers decision sft satisfies the first order condition
Et


@ft
sft

= Et

fwft (1  wft)At+1   k0ft (sft)

= 0:
Moment equations can be based on this expression, and included in the GMM objective func-
tion.
The big threat for the free press is that their returns depends dramatically onAt; and they are
relatively sensitive to falls in overall advertising budget At due to economic crisis, compared
to classical paid Newspapers. Notice that if At declines due, e.g., to an economic crisis, all
regular newspapers can raise copy prices for the readers’ market and compensate for the loss.
However free newspapers do not have the possibility to compensate the effect of contractions
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in At, which possess a significant threat to their survival.
5 Concluding Remarks
Monopolistic competition is a powerful conceptual framework to study firms’ interactions, gen-
erally more accurately than assuming perfect competition or a classical homogeneous-product
oligopoly. In most sectors there are a number of key firm players which tend to differentiate
their product to obtain certain levels of market power. But modeling MC competition is not
straightforward. Essentially, MC literature has considered price as the key decision variable,
given the difficulty of producing flexible nonlinear inverse demand systems required to model
competition in quantities. The main contribution of this paper is methodological. We have
presented an inverse demand system capable of approximating many different data shapes, and
have discussed how this model can be applied in MC when firms compete in quantity. We
also consider extension of the model to work with alternative product categories. The model is
essentially static, but it can be implemented in dynamic setups.
We have presented an empirical application to show the usability of the model. The em-
pirical application is stochastic and dynamic, and it shows how the benchmark model can be
implemented in relatively complex settings. We believe that the model and methodology em-
ployed in this paper are broadly applicable to other types of industries in which a few firms
compete in the same market with a closely related but not homogeneous product.
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Appendix
A1 Marshallian demand system
The demand system can be obtained using the linear system (4) and the budget constraint. For
example, when L = 3; setting (4) for l; j equal to 1; 2 and 1; 3 the demand system can be solved
from the linear system
0BBBB@
1  2 0
1 0  3
p1 p2 p3
1CCCCA
0BBBB@
q1
q2
q3
1CCCCA =
0BBBB@
ln p1   ln p2   1 + 2
ln p1   ln p3   1 + 3
m
1CCCCA ;
where we just need to compute the inverse
0BBBB@
1  2 0
1 0  3
p1 p2 p3
1CCCCA
 1
=
1
12p3 + 13p2 + 23p1
0BBBB@
3p2 2p3 23
  (3p1 + 1p3) 1p3 13
1p2   (2p1 + 1p2) 12
1CCCCA :
With L = 4 the result is analogous, but now the relevant inverse is
0BBBBBBB@
1  2 0 0
1 0  3 0
1 0 0  4
p1 p2 p3 p4
1CCCCCCCA
 1
=
1
123p4 + 124p3 + 134p2 + 234p1

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0BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB@
34p2 24p3t 23p4 234
 
0B@ 13p4+14p3
+34p1
1CA 14p3 13p4 134
14p2  
0B@ 12p4 + 14p2
+24p1
1CA 12p4 124
13p2t 12p3t  
0B@ 12p3 + 13p2
+23p1
1CA 123
1CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCA
Let BL denote the analogous matrix for L goods. The element i; j of the inverse is
B 1i;j =
1PL
l=1 pl
Q
j 6=l j
 
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
p(j+1)
Q
l =2f(j+1);1g j

i = 1; j < L
 
P
l 6=(j+1) pl
Q
l =2f(j+1);lg j

i > 1; j < L
p(j+1)
Q
l =2f(j+1);ig j

i > 1; j < LQ
l 6=i l j = L
A2 Inverse Demand Robustness to Consumer’s Heterogeneity
Consider N heterogeneous consumers (i = 1; ::; N ), with preferences (1) defined by different
parameters (i; i) (i = 1; ::; N ). Without loss of generality, we assume that the parameters
(i; i) are independently drawn from a probability density function g (; ) on a closed inter-
val, and each consumer has an inverse demand system. Let q(;) (p) denote the demand of an
individual with parameters (; ) given a price p; and p(;) = p
 
q(;)

the inverse demand
system.
The market inverse demand can be derived using that the j-th price is defined by the geo-
metric mean of individuals’ inverse demands. In particular for the j-th product, we obtain
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that
pj =
 
NY
i=1
p
(i;i)
j
! 1
N
=
NY
i=1
 
exp
 
ij + 
i
jq
i
j
PL
l=1 exp (
i
l + 
i
lq
i
l)
! 1
N
=
exp

N 1
XN
i=1
 
ij + 
i
jq
i
j

PL
l=1 exp

N 1
XN
i=1
(il + 
i
lq
i
l)

! exp
 R  
+ qj

gj (; ) dd
PL
l=1 exp
 R
(+ ql ) gl (; ) dd
 (A-1)
where gj (; ) denotes the marginal density of
 
ij; 
i
j

; and we have assumed that the Strong
Law of Large Numbers can be applied so that
N 1
NX
i=1
 
ij + 
i
jq
i
j
!a:s: E h+ q(;)j i = Z + q(;)j  gj (; ) d (; ) ;
for a large N . Applying the Second Mean Value Theorem for integrals1, we can express (A-1)
as
=
exp
 
j + j
R
qj gj () d
PL
l=1 exp
 
l + l
R
ql gl () d


exp
n
j + j

N 1
XN
i=1
qij
o
PL
l=1 exp
n
l + l

N 1
XN
i=1
qil
o
for some
 
; 

. The term N 1 can be included in the parameters  and we obtain an expres-
sion identical to (6), providing a relationship between geometric mean of individual inverse
demands and the aggregated demanded quantities.
1The Second Mean Value Theorem for Integrals, state that if f (x) and g (x) are continuous on [a; b] and
g (x)  0 for any x 2 [a; b], then there exists c 2 (a; b) such thatZ b
a
f (x) g (x) dx = f (c)
Z b
a
g (x) dx:
The number f (c) is called the g (x)-weighted average of f (x) on the interval [a; b].33
